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DEBUNKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA 
COLLECTION FROM MERE ARRESTEES IN 
LIGHT OF MARYLAND V. KING  
CHRISTEN GIANNAROS1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: David, a drug dealer, meets Victor 
through some friends at a party. As their friendship grows, David, who 
Victor does not know is a drug dealer, asks Victor to hold a package for a 
few weeks. Victor accepts, unaware that the package contains five pounds 
of cocaine. As it turns out, detectives have been surveilling David for 
months, and upon approaching him, offer to not prosecute him if he 
provides the detectives with his drug source. David, taking advantage of the 
detective’s appealing offer, implicates Victor, telling the detectives where 
and how much cocaine Victor has. After procuring a search warrant, the 
detectives arrest Victor, bring him to the station house, and take a sample 
of his DNA via cheek swab. Victor’s DNA is processed in a nation-wide 
DNA database that runs DNA taken from arrestees and convicts against a 
database that contains samples from perpetrators who have left their DNA 
behind at crime scenes, hoping to find a match. 
Victor’s DNA, however, is never matched to an unknown sample.  Later, 
the charges against Victor are dismissed for lack of evidence, but Victor’s 
DNA is still in the database until he affirmatively takes action to remove it.  
Even then, the government will retain a copy of Victor’s sample 
indefinitely. 
This hypothetical illustrates the less glamorous side of DNA collection 
 
1 J.D., 2015, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Queens College, City University of 
New York. 
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statutes.  Usually, the use of DNA in capturing a criminal is hailed as an 
incredible advent of technology, but consideration is rarely given to the 
constitutional implications that these glorious triumphs carry with them.  
For example, in Maryland v. King,2 a man arrested on assault charges had 
his DNA collected pursuant to state law.3 After his DNA was processed, he 
was linked to an unsolved 2003 rape case, and subsequently prosecuted.4  
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, upheld the validity of 
DNA collection from mere arrestees because it served the legitimate 
governmental interest of accurately identifying an arrestee as the person he 
claims to be.5 Scalia’s scathing dissent, however, argued that this 
“identification” use is instead a pretext for an impermissible use of the 
Fourth Amendment—”[to search] a person for evidence of a crime when 
there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime.”6 Scalia was 
referring to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of an individual’s privacy 
by requiring that law enforcement have “probable cause” before initiating a 
search against any person.7 He argued that when an arrestee—a person who 
has not yet been convicted of a crime—has his DNA collected and 
searched against a system of “unsolved” crimes, law enforcement officials 
lack probable cause to link that individual to any of the crimes that his 
DNA is being searched against.  
The Maryland8 and federal9 DNA collection statutes upheld in King 
result in serious Fourth Amendment deprivations, the most significant of 
these being the violation of the general prohibition against searches without 
probable cause.  Accordingly, this Comment proposes a series of legislative 
changes that would protect a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, but still 
allow for the existence of arrestee DNA collection statutes.  Under these 
changes, an arrestee’s DNA is searched only against DNA in which there 
exists probable cause to run a search.  This revision to the current statutory 
scheme would preserve both the government’s and the arrestee’s interests 
substantially. 
Part II of this Comment summarizes the science behind DNA use, the 
inner workings of the government’s Combined DNA Index System 
 
2 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
3 Id. at 1966. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1970. 
6 Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
8 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2012). 
9 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006). 
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(CODIS), and current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III explores 
the rationale behind the majority and dissenting opinions in King, while 
Part IV engages in a critical analysis of it, mainly attacking the majority’s 
conclusion that arrestees maintain a diminished expectation of privacy that 
justifies the warrantless searches of their DNA. Part V considers the 
unrecognized consequences of the Court’s decision, while Part VI offers a 
series of legislative remedies that bring the arrestee DNA collection 
statutes in compliance with the Constitution.  
II. BACKGROUND: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DNA, CODIS, AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT   
DNA contains information specific to each person, allowing forensic 
scientists to match DNA samples by creating links of this specific 
information between the sample and its origin.10 Because this unique 
identifying feature of DNA can help law enforcement identify criminals, 
the federal government created the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 
to store DNA information.11 CODIS, however, raises serious Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 
A. Biology 101 - A Beginner’s Guide To DNA 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is present in every nucleus-containing cell 
in the human body.12 Shaped like a double helix, this molecule contains the 
genetic makeup of each individual.13 DNA molecules are located in the 
nucleus of each cell and are formed in strands.14 The sides of each strand 
are connected by “bases,” which form ladder-like steps within the 
strands.15 There are four types of bases: A (adenine), C (cytosine), G 
(guanine), and T (thymine).16 In forming the ladder steps, the bases connect 
in a very specific manner—A always pairs with T, and C always pairs with 
 
10 John D. Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and 
Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 623-24 (2009). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b) (2006). 
12 Lisa R. Kreeger & Danielle M. Weiss, Forensic DNA Fundamentals for the Prosecutor: Be Not 
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G.17 The areas on the chromosome in which the base pairs repeat are called 
“loci”.18 It is the precise order in which these bases connect that create an 
individual’s DNA sequence, and the differences in DNA sequences give 
each individual their unique identity.19 Fascinatingly, no two individuals 
share the same DNA sequence.20 
Because crime scene evidence is often in the form of blood, hair, or 
saliva, it is no wonder that the DNA present in such biological evidence is 
extremely helpful in the criminal justice context.  Forensic scientists collect 
DNA and create a “suspect profile,” analyzing the unique order in which 
the base pairs connect.21 In practice, forensic scientists use short tandem 
repeat (STR) testing as a method to compare the repeated base pair 
sequences to loci on other chromosomes.22 The likelihood that two 
individuals share the same number of STRs at all the various loci tested is 
almost impossible, thus ensuring that DNA profiles remain distinct.23 Once 
a profile is analyzed, it is stored in a DNA database for future access.24 
Future collections of DNA evidence from either individuals in police 
custody or from crime scenes are compared against the suspect profiles in 
the database, and prosecution may begin against an individual if a match is 
found.  
Despite the seemingly comprehensive knowledge that scientists have 
about DNA, DNA largely remains a mystery—over 98 percent of DNA 
performs an unknown function.25 
B. Creation of a Profile in CODIS 
In enacting the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, Congress authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to 
collect DNA from both convicted felony offenders and crime scenes where 
DNA was left behind.26 The FBI used this grant of authority to create 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 5.   
19 Id. at 3-4.   
20 Id. Identical twins are the only exception to this rule. 
21 Id. at 6.  
22 D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
455, 461 (2001).  
23 Id. 
24 Irina Sivachenko, DNA as the Twenty-First Century Fingerprint: Approval of DNA Collection 
Upon Arrest in United States v. Mitchell, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-Supplement 249, 252 (2012). 
25 Jaan Suurkula, Junk DNA, PSRAST.ORG, http://www.psrast.org/junkdna.htm (last visited Jan. 8 
2014).  
26 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012) (“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish 
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CODIS, a combined effort by local, state, and federal governments to join 
their DNA databases in order to grant seamless access to law enforcement 
officials.27 In response to privacy concerns, only “junk” DNA—the portion 
of DNA that contains information pertaining to the identity of the 
individual, but no other physical or medical characteristics—is analyzed.28  
CODIS is expansive; all 50 states mandate the collection of DNA from 
certain convicted felons.29 Courts have upheld the practice of collecting 
and maintaining DNA samples and profiles from convicted felons.30 
Recently, however, controversy over whether DNA collection applies to 
mere arrestees has surfaced—mostly because arrestees are not yet 
convicted of a crime and may ultimately be acquitted or found not guilty.  
Arrestee-collection statutes were first pioneered by the states,31 with the 
federal government quickly following suit with the DNA Fingerprint Act of 
2005, expressly authorizing the collection of DNA from arrestees.32 The 
Act contains certain safeguards: disclosure of DNA is limited to criminal 
justice agencies for identification purposes, legal proceedings, and research 
 
an index of . . . DNA identification records of persons convicted of crimes . . . [and] analyses of DNA 
samples recovered from crime scenes”). 
27 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000) (noting that “CODIS allows State and local forensics 
laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from 
crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the 
system); see also Kaye, supra note 12 at 462. 
28 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27. Because of the sensitive information that DNA contains, 
only junk DNA is analyzed when creating a CODIS profile: 
[T]he genetic markers used for forensic DNA testing were purposely selected because they are not 
associated with any known physical or medical characteristics, providing further assurance against 
the use of convicted offender DNA profiles for purposes other than law enforcement identification 
. . . [T]hey show only the configuration of DNA at selected “junk sites” which do not control or 
influence the expression of any trait. DNA records in the national database contain the following 
information only: an agency identifier for the agencies submitting the DNA profile; the specimen 
identification number; the DNA profile; and the name of the DNA personnel associated with the 
DNA analysis. [CODIS DNA profiles] do not reveal information relating to any medical condition 
or other trait. By design, the effect of the system is to provide a kind of genetic fingerprint, which 
uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything 
else about the person. 
29 See CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); see also Michelle Hibbert, DNA 
Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 775 (1999).  
30 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996). 
31 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A)(1) (2005) (“A person who is arrested for a felony . . 
. shall have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is fingerprinted”); VA. CODE ANN. § 
19.2-310.2:1 (2004) (“Every person arrested for the commission or attempted commission of a violent 
felony . . . shall have a sample of his saliva or tissue taken for DNA analysis”). 
32 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006) (“The Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation may establish an index of DNA identification records of . . . persons convicted 
of crimes, persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a crime”). 
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and development.33 The Act also places a criminal penalty of imprisonment 
of up to one 1 year or a fine of no more than $250,000 for anyone who 
“knowingly discloses a sample or result . . . in any manner to any person 
not authorized to receive it, or obtains or uses, without authorization, such 
sample or result.”34 
To remove one’s DNA information from CODIS, an individual must go 
through the process enumerated in the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act.35 A DNA profile may be expunged from CODIS if two 
conditions are met.  First, a DNA profile may be expunged if a conviction 
is overturned, a charge is dismissed, or if an individual is arrested but not 
charged.36 Second, a final court order must be submitted establishing 
such.37 Effectively, the burden is placed on the individual to expunge the 
information.  The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 
however, only explains how to expunge DNA profiles, not DNA samples.38 
A DNA sample is a bodily sample from an individual on which DNA 
analysis can be performed.39 Conversely, a DNA analysis (or profile) is the 
actual analysis of a bodily sample.40 Congress has peculiarly remained 
silent on the issue of expungement for the actual DNA sample, leading 
scholars to believe that the government indefinitely retains DNA samples.41  
In sum, when a DNA sample is collected from an arrestee, that sample is 
run against unknown DNA samples in CODIS.  If a match is found, 
proceedings against the arrestee may begin for that crime linked to the 
matched DNA sample. The Fourth Amendment is offended, however, each 
time such a search is run, because law enforcement (a) have no warrant or 
 
33 Id. at § 14132(b)(3) (noting that stored DNA samples and analyses are only disclosed to 
“criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes; in judicial proceedings; . . . for 
criminal defense purposes . . . or if personally identifiable information is removed, for a population 
statistics database, [or] for identification research”). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2004). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1). The expungement process requires that the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation expunge the DNA analysis of a person who submits a “certified copy of a final 
court order establishing that [the] conviction has been overturned[.]” The Director must also expunge 
the DNA analysis of anyone who is arrested and charged, upon submitting a “certified copy of a final 
court order establishing that [the] charge has been dismissed or has resulted in an acquittal or that no 
charge was filed within the applicable time period.”  
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Stephanie Beaugh, How the DNA Act Violates the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy of Mere 
Arrestees and Pre-Trial Detainees, 59 LOY. L. REV. 157, 165 (2013). 
40 Id. 
41 See id. at 170; see also Jason Tarricone, “An Ordinary Citizen Just Like Everyone Else”: The 
Indefinite Retention of Former Offenders’ DNA, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 209, 221 
(2005).  
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probable cause to search the arrestee’s DNA, and (b) have no probable 
cause to link the arrestee to the crime linked to the now-matched DNA 
sample.  
C. An Overview of the Fourth Amendment  
The Fourth Amendment affords to the people the “right to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”42  For an individual to invoke this amendment’s protection, she 
must first establish that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in that 
which she is seeking to protect against search or seizure.43  To establish 
this, an individual must have (1) a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) 
an expectation of privacy that society deems reasonable.44  Once this 
expectation of privacy is established, law enforcement may only search a 
person or place upon the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.45 
Although strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s requirements is 
almost always required, the Court has loosened these requirements in very 
limited circumstances.46 
One such exception is the “special needs” test.47 This test renders the 
probable cause and warrant requirement unnecessary in situations where 
“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.”48 In other words, 
courts do not apply this exception if the policy in question is geared 
towards solving or detecting crimes, because solving or detecting crimes is 
not “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”49 Accordingly, the 
Court has applied this exception in cases where the search is conducted for 
reasons other than promoting normal law enforcement goals, such as 
 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
43 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 
44 Id.; cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that there is no reasonable 
expectation in one’s trash placed outside for public collection). 
45 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
46 See Beaugh, supra note 39, at 175-92; see also Tarricone, supra note 41, at 217-21.  
47 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). 
48 Id. 
49 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). 
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maintaining drunk-driver free roads,50 public safety on railroads,51 school 
discipline,52 and effective workplaces.53 Because the very nature of this 
exception is to serve the public interest, no individualized suspicion is 
necessary in searching an individual pursuant to this test.54  
Courts have created a second exception for certain groups of people with 
the “totality of the circumstances” test.55 This test is used when a court 
must determine if, in executing a warrantless search, police officers had 
probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime.56 In 
determining whether a search was reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances, a court balances the government’s interests against an 
individual’s expectation of privacy.57 Often, an individual’s expectation of 
privacy depends on his or her legal status.58 Accordingly, courts have held 
that prisoners,59 probationers,60 and parolees61 have diminished privacy 
rights and are therefore subject to warrantless searches that are 
“reasonable.”62 The rationale behind this position is that once in state 
custody, the government has a legitimate interest in a convict or prisoner’s 
 
50 See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding the 
constitutionality of police sobriety check points because states have a substantial governmental interest 
in preventing drunk driving).  
51 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633 (1989) (upholding random drug testing on railroad employees 
because they are engaged in “safety-sensitive tasks”). 
52 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of 
student athletes by public schools because schools have an interest in preventing student drug use). 
53 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (upholding work-related searches of public 
employees because they are incident to employment). 
54 See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665. 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 414 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that collection of 
defendant’s DNA was reasonable when the court balanced the scope of sensitive information stored in 
DNA with the government’s interest in collecting information to aid law enforcement); see also United 
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the collection of a probationer’s 
DNA was justified under the totality of the circumstances when the court balanced the intrusion of the 
blood test with the fact that the defendant was a convicted felon). 
56 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
57 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
58 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (stating that “Although the underlying 
command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures must be reasonable, what is 
reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place”); see also United States v. 
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005) (holding 
that “parolees have demonstrated by their adjudicated criminal conduct a capacity and willingness to 
commit crimes serious enough to deprive them of liberty”). 
59 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S 517 (1984) (holding that prisoner who was searched by prison 
guards did not suffer Fourth Amendment violation because “privacy” is incompatible with prison 
security). 
60 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of warrantless 
searches of probationer’s home by probation officer because he remained in the custody of the state). 
61 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (upholding random search of parolee by parole 
officer because parolee was still in custody of the state until his sentence was completed). 
62 See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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identity.63  For example, this interest stems from law enforcement’s need to 
ascertain who an individual is in the event that a prisoner or convict alters 
his appearance. 
In contrast to the special needs exception, the totality of the 
circumstances test generally requires some degree of individualized 
suspicion.  Often, the fact that an individual is in the state’s custody is 
grounds for such suspicion because that individual’s expectation of privacy 
is diminished.64  Just like the special needs exception, however, a search 
analyzed using the totality of the circumstances test (and any search in 
general) may never be for the purpose of ordinary-crime solving.65  As the 
next section explains, however, this very premise was violated in Maryland 
v. King. 
III. THE SEMINAL CASE: EXPLORING THE RATIONALE BEHIND MARYLAND 
V. KING 
In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested for menacing a group of people with 
a shotgun.66 Incident to his arrest, and pursuant to Maryland law,67 police 
officers took a sample of King’s DNA by placing a cotton swab to the 
inside of his cheeks.68 Once King’s DNA was collected, processed, and 
analyzed, it was revealed that King’s DNA matched the DNA sample 
recovered at an unsolved 2003 rape case.69 A search warrant was issued 
and King was subsequently prosecuted for the 2003 rape case.70 King 
moved to suppress the DNA match, arguing that the Maryland statute 
authorizing such DNA collection violated his Fourth Amendment right 
 
63 See, e.g., Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196–97 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 
(1990) (holding blood testing of prisoners constitutional in light of government’s interest in controlling 
AIDS in prison). 
64 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 849-50; see also Charles J. Nerko, Assessing Fourth Amendment 
Challenges to DNA Extraction Statutes After Samson v. California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926-937 
(2008). 
65 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). When a search is 
incident to an arrest, the search “either serves other ends (such as officer safety, in a search for 
weapons) or is not suspicionless (as when there is reason to believe the arrestee possesses evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest).  
66 Id. at 1965. 
67 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2012) (“[A] DNA sample shall be collected 
from an individual who is charged with a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of 
violence”). 
68 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. 
69 Id. at 1966. 
70 Id. 
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against unreasonable searches and seizures.71 The Supreme Court granted a 
writ of certiorari to address the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits the collection and analysis of DNA samples from mere arrestees 
that have not yet been convicted.72 
Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito held that the 
procedure was constitutional.  The Court applied the “totality of the 
circumstances” test, balancing the interests of the government against an 
arrestee’s expectation of privacy. In doing so, it found that the 
government’s legitimate interest in accurately identifying an arrestee 
outweighed the expectation of privacy of an arrestee.  
In beginning its inquiry, the Court noted that a cheek swab for an 
arrestee’s DNA constitutes a search.73 The Court then proceeded to analyze 
the reasonableness of the search by identifying the legitimate governmental 
interests served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act.  The Court stated 
that “the legitimate government interest . . . is one that is well established: 
the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process 
and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.”74 
The Court’s opinion examined (1) the state’s interest in accurately 
identifying arrestees in its custody, (2) the state’s interest in doing so 
safely, and (3) the state’s interest in properly processing an arrestee. 
The first and most emphasized interest the Court recognized was the 
need for law enforcement officers to be able to accurately identify persons 
in its custody.75 According to the majority, the search of King’s person was 
incident to his legal arrest and thus was valid.76 The search of his person, 
which yielded his DNA, was purportedly further justified by the fact that 
the government has an interest in an arrestee’s identity, which “goes 
beyond ensuring that the proper name is typed on the indictment.”77 
Collection of an arrestee’s DNA is critical in determining a suspect’s 
criminal history, which in turn helps law enforcement identify an arrestee, 
the Court opined.78 The Court reasoned that this quest to determine past 
criminal history is indistinguishable from comparing a suspect’s booking 
photograph to a sketch artist’s drawing of a perpetrator, except for the fact 
 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 1969. 
74 Id. at 1970. 
75 Id. at 1971. 
76 Id. at 1970-71.  
77 Id. at 1971.  
78 Id.  
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that DNA is more accurate.79 The Court mentioned that fingerprints and 
DNA are both forms of identification that perform the same function.80 
The Court moved on to examine the second recognized state interest: 
ensuring that the custody of an arrestee does not pose a risk to staff or other 
detainees.81  DNA identification is useful in this context because it can help 
law enforcement evaluate the risk an arrestee poses, such as a past history 
of violence or mental disorder.82 This is particularly helpful, the Court 
reasoned, because an arrestee’s name lacks the ability to furnish such 
elaborate information.83  
The Court then recognized the third state interest in “ensuring that 
persons accused of crimes are available for trials.”84 In possessing an 
arrestee’s DNA, law enforcement can more accurately gauge an 
individual’s likelihood of fleeing the instant charges, if, for example, the 
instant charge is less severe than the uncharged crime an arrestee’s DNA 
information links him to.85 This is also relevant to a fourth consideration 
the Court probed: whether or not an individual should be released on bail.86 
An arrestee’s “future dangerousness” can impact a judge’s decision about 
whether an individual should be released on bail and how much bail should 
be set.87  
Next the Court further examined the similarities between DNA 
identification and fingerprinting.88 Citing Judge Hand, the Court reiterated 
the belief that fingerprinting was a widely accepted and thus unchallenged 
procedure,89 indicating that DNA identification will attain the same status 
once it ceases to be so novel.90  
To end its inquiry and complete the balancing test, the Court examined 
 
79 Id. at 1971-1972.  
80 Id. at 1972. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). 
83 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1972. 
84 Id. at 1964 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)).  
85 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1973. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1973-1974.  
88 Id. at 1976. 
89 Id. (citing United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1932)). 
90 The first noted instance of fingerprinting in a criminal case dates back to 1892 in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. MARK R. HAWTHORNE, FINGERPRINTS: ANALYSIS AND UNDERSTANDING 9 (CRC Press et 
al. eds., 2009). In contrast, the first use of arrestee DNA was in Louisiana after it passed a law 
authorizing such use in 1997. DNA Sample Collection From Arrestees, NIJ.GOV, 
http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 
2013). 
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the other side of the equation: the arrestee’s expectation of privacy.  
Because “the expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police 
custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope,’”91 an arrestee’s person 
and possessions are subject to “extensive exploration,”92 and arrestees may 
even have to lift their genitals or cough in a squatted position.93 The Court 
placed further focus on the nonintrusive nature of the search, holding that 
the “gentle rub” of a cotton swab contains no risks of danger to the 
arrestee.94  
Next, the Court looked to whether the processing of King’s DNA sample 
intruded his expectation of privacy.  The Court first noted that the CODIS 
loci came from junk DNA, which does not reveal any sensitive genetic 
information.95 By stating that junk DNA in its current understanding does 
not have the capability to reveal such information, the Court sidestepped 
the issue as to whether junk DNA can reveal sensitive information 
sometime in the future.96 Alternatively, the Court determined that even if 
genetic information can be retrieved from junk DNA, it is not tested for 
that purpose.97 Instead, the Court stated that law enforcement officials use a 
DNA sample to generate only a unique serial number that correlates to the 
sample so that future samples can be matched to it.98 Specifically, a House 
Report explains that “DNA records in the national database contain the 
following information only: an agency identifier for the agencies 
submitting the DNA profile; the specimen identification number; the DNA 
profile; and the name of the DNA personnel associated with the DNA 
analysis.”99  
Lastly, the Court considered the safeguards within the Maryland Act to 
conclude that the state’s legitimate interests supersede King’s expectation 
of privacy.  The Act forbids the collection of DNA information that 
pertains to information other than the identification of the individual.100 
Therefore, since the act forbids any other use of an arrestee’s DNA, the 
 
91 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)). 
92 Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). 
93 See id. (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Ctny. Of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 
1510, 1520 (2012)).  
94 Id. at 1979.  
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
98 Id. 
99 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1 at 27 (2000). 
100 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (quoting MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. § 2-512(c)) (effective Jan. 
1, 2009). 
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majority found that the search of his DNA did not intrude on King’s 
expectation of privacy.  
In a scathing dissent, which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
joined, Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s finding that “identification” 
was Maryland’s legitimate interest was really a pretext for solving 
unsolved crimes, a “noble” but impermissible interest under Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.101 The dissent framed its analysis under the 
general principle that the Fourth Amendment “forbids searching a person 
for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is 
guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence. That 
prohibition is categorical and without exception; it lies at the very heart of 
the Fourth Amendment.”102 The dissent then began to pick apart the 
majority’s rationale by reiterating the circumstances when applying the 
“special needs” and “totality of the circumstances” tests are appropriate.  
When no individualized suspicion to search an individual exists, the special 
needs test applies only when the search is done for reasons other than 
ordinary crime solving.103 On the other hand, when individualized 
suspicion is present, the totality of the circumstances test applies only when 
a governmental purpose other than crime solving is at issue.104 The dissent 
ultimately undermined the one proposition that the majority’s totality of the 
circumstances test relied on: that the principal purpose of the DNA search 
was something other than detecting criminal wrongdoing.105 
Justice Scalia first noted that a search incident to an arrest may only be 
executed to yield either weapons or evidence that the individual may 
destroy, or evidence that is relevant to the crime of arrest.106 In searching 
an arrestee for his DNA, none of these objectives are satisfied.107 Scalia 
argued that by recognizing this, the majority attempted to emphasize the 
fact that the search had a goal of “identifying” King.108 As mentioned 
earlier, the majority stated that an arrestee’s past criminal history (which 
running an arrestee’s DNA against the CODIS database would reveal, 
 
101 See Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 1980. 
103 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47 for an illustration of case law applying the special 
needs test. 
104 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1982. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2009); Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
107 Id.. 
108 Id. 
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assuming there is a match found) is relevant to determine his “identity.”109  
The majority justified this conclusion by rattling off a list of government 
interests in an arrestee’s identity: it can inform law enforcement of the 
violent past/tendencies of an individual and ensure that the arrestee is 
appropriately handled if he presents a risk to staff and other detainees,110 
can determine the likelihood that an arrestee will return for trial in light of 
knowledge of his past crimes,111 and can help inform a judge if and when 
an arrestee should be released on bail once due consideration is given to the 
arrestee’s past record.112 But the majority seemed to establish an arrestee’s 
identity by identifying what unsolved crimes the arrestee has committed, 
the dissent pointed out.113 In turn, this becomes “indistinguishable from the 
ordinary law-enforcement aims that have never been thought to justify a 
suspicionless search.”114 
Scalia then argued that confirming King’s identity could not have been 
so urgently crucial to determine the risks of danger he posed to society, as 
the majority held, in light of the fact that Maryland law enforcement took 
three days to begin testing King’s DNA.115 Because Maryland law 
mandated this three-day waiting period before DNA could be tested,116 the 
dissent suggested that Maryland lawmakers did not enact the law with the 
majority’s purpose of “identification” in mind.117 The dissent similarly 
undermined the majority’s conclusion that King’s identification was crucial 
to the judge’s decision to set bail.  The fact that Maryland law prohibited 
DNA testing until King was arraigned was at odds with the majority’s 
ascribed purpose, since bail is often set during arraignment, and in 
Maryland’s case, without the qualifying “identification information” the 
DNA sample apparently would provide.118 Scalia further illustrated this 
 
109 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1972. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1972-73. 
112 Id. at 1973.  
113 Id. at 1983 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
114 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1983 
115 Id.  
116 Id.; MD. PUB. SAF. CODE ANN. § 2-504(d)(1) (2011). § 2-504(d)(1) states that:  
A DNA sample collected from an individual charged with a crime under subsection (a)(3) of this 
section may not be tested or placed in the statewide DNA data base system prior to the first 
scheduled arraignment date unless requested or consented to by the individual as provided in 
paragraph (3) of this subsection.  
117 Id. For example, MD. PUB. SAF. CODE ANN. § 2-512(c)-(e) goes as far as imposing a 
punishment of up to five years’ imprisonment to anyone who tests an individual’s DNA information in 
anyway except as provided in the statute. 
118 Id. at 1984. 
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point by noting the length of time it took the Maryland State Police 
Forensic Science Division to test King’s sample: his sample was seized on 
April 10, 2009, was received by the forensic unit on April 23, 2009, and 
was mailed to a lab for testing on June 25, 2009 – almost three months 
from the date of King’s arrest.119 The lab results were finally made 
available on July 13, 2009, and on August 4, 2009, it was revealed that 
King’s sample yielded a match to the 2003 unsolved rape case.120 
Still, Scalia opined that King could not have been “identified” by this 
match.121 Scalia noted that CODIS is categorized by two distinct 
collections.122 The first collection, which Scalia named the “Convict and 
Arrestee Collection,” contains DNA samples taken from known convicts 
and arrestees.123 He named the second collection the “Unsolved Crimes 
Collection,” which consists of unknown samples taken from crime 
scenes.124 The “Convict and Arrestee Collection” does not contain any 
information that could identify who the sample was taken from, such as a 
name, for example.125 This collection instead contains only the “DNA 
information itself, the name of the agency that submitted it, the laboratory 
personnel who analyzed it, and an identification number for the 
specimen.”126 The only reason CODIS does not allow any identifying 
information for a given specimen is because “the submitting state 
laboratories are expected already to know the identities of the convicts and 
arrestees from whom samples are taken,”127 Scalia reasoned. Furthermore, 
the majority’s “identification” purpose is not achieved when considering 
CODIS’s central function: checking the samples contained in the 
“Unsolved Crimes Collection” against the samples in the “Convict and 
Arrestee Collection.”128 If identification was the state’s actual purpose, 
 
119 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. (citing FBI, CODIS, and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited October 2, 2015)). 
123 Id. 
124 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
125 Id.; See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (stating that “DNA records in the 
national database contain the following information only: an agency identifier for the agencies 
submitting the DNA profile; the specimen identification number; the DNA profile; and the name of the 
DNA personnel associated with the DNA analysis”). 
126 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. Other methods of “identifying” King include taking and checking his fingerprints, and 
documenting his name, sex, race, height, weight, date of birth, and address. Id. at 1985. Also, Scalia 
suggested that if the DNA testing were aimed at “identifying” King, then the lab results would have 
returned actual results of his identification.  
128 Id. at 1984. 
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then it would check King’s DNA sample against the “Convict and Arrestee 
Collection” in order to search whether King was already in the system.129 If 
King was in the system, then a match would appear, and law enforcement 
would be able to conclusively determine that Alfonso King was really who 
he claimed to be.  
The only thing that was “identified” was the previously taken DNA 
sample from the 2003 crime scene.130 Scalia argued that King’s identity 
was already known; the police had taken his full name, race, sex, height, 
weight, date of birth, and address.131 Just as no one would say that an 
arrestee is “identified” when he matches the description of a man on a 
“wanted” poster, no one would say that the matched DNA sample 
“identified” King.132 Instead, the man in the “wanted” poster is identified, 
and in King’s case, it is the previously unidentified perpetrator in the 2003 
rape case that is identified.133  
Scalia then criticized the majority for failing to consider the actual text 
of the Maryland Act, which would presumably shed light on Maryland’s 
intended “purpose” in collecting arrestee DNA.134 Proceeding to analyze 
what the majority ignored, the dissent noted that “identification” was not 
among the Act’s intended purposes. Section 2-505(a)(2) of the Act135 states 
that DNA samples are tested “as a part of an official investigation into a 
crime,” or as Scalia put it, for ordinary law-enforcement purposes.136 The 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
135 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a) states that DNA samples shall be collected and 
tested: 
 (1) to analyze and type the genetic markers contained in or derived from the DNA samples; 
 (2) as part of an official investigation into a crime; 
 (3) to help identify human remains; 
 (4) to help identify missing individuals; and 
 (5) for research and administrative purposes, including: 
  (i)  development of a population data base after personal identifying information is removed; 
 (ii) support of identification research and protocol development of forensic DNA analysis
 methods; and 
  (iii) quality control. 
136 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia illustrated this point further by 
providing a comment from the Governor of Maryland. He commented that he was glad the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear the case because “[a]llowing law enforcement to collect DNA samples . 
. . is absolutely critical to our efforts to continue driving down crime,” and “bolsters our efforts to 
resolve open investigations and bring them to a resolution.” Id. (citing Marbella, Supreme Court Will 
Review Md. DNA Law, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 10, 2012, at 1, 14).  
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Act mentions using a DNA sample for identification, but only for the 
purposes of identifying human remains137 and to help identify missing 
individuals.138  
In its final remarks, the dissent addressed the majority’s analogy between 
fingerprints and DNA.139 The majority’s analogy was improperly drawn, 
Scalia argued, because fingerprints are used to actually identify an arrestee, 
while DNA is used to solve crimes.140  Furthermore, the FBI’s Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) contains the 
identifying information that the DNA profile lacks, including criminal 
history, mug shots, and physical markers like tattoos, scars, height, weight, 
and eye color.141 The fingerprint system is more than adequate to address 
the government’s “identity” concerns; all that DNA adds is the promising 
benefits of solving crimes.142 In sum, Scalia questioned the authenticity of 
the majority’s conclusion that law enforcement retains a substantial interest 
in an arrestee’s DNA for identification purposes, especially when the 
Maryland statute did not include “identification” as a purpose, and when a 
fingerprint system already exists to meet these concerns. 
IV. UNDERMINING THE MAJORITY’S RATIONALE  
As the dissent pointed out, the majority in King made some obvious 
errors.  First, by failing to consider the text of the Maryland statute itself, 
the Court did not recognize that “identification” was never the legislature’s 
purpose.  Additionally, many of the majority’s points are at odds with the 
actual statute—or example, the fact that Maryland mandated a three-day 
waiting period before testing a DNA sample is at odds with the majority’s 
belief that urgent identification was necessary to identify any violent 
tendencies or risks King could pose.143 The Court also made a hasty 
determination in holding that arrestees have a diminished expectation of 
privacy. The dissent avoided rebutting this portion of the majority’s 
holding, but, as I explain below, the majority’s reasoning in reaching that 
conclusion is flawed. 
 
137 Id. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a)(3)). 
138 Id. (citing § 2-505(a)(4)).  
139 Id. at 1987 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
140 Id. 
141 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1987.  Fingerprints recovered from crimes scenes are not compared 
against a database of known fingerprints.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1983 (2013). 
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A. An Arrestee’s Privacy Interests are Superior to the Government’s 
Interests 
An arrestee can find himself in three situations: (1) he can be arrested, 
charged, and convicted; (2) he can be arrested and charged but not 
convicted; or (3) he can be arrested, not charged, and released.  In the last 
two situations, the arrestee is never convicted of a crime.  The collection of 
an arrestee’s DNA is impermissible because arrestee’s maintain an 
expectation of privacy that surpasses that of a parolee, probationer, or 
convict.  This is because of the appreciable differences between an arrestee, 
parolee, probationer, and convict: the arrestee is the only individual in this 
group who has not been convicted of a crime—the very reason why 
parolees, probationers, and convicts have a diminished expectation of 
privacy.  Because arrestees maintain an expectation of privacy, a search of 
the arrestee’s DNA would not be justified without a warrant or probable 
cause.  
The majority, in applying the totality of the circumstances test, found 
that an arrestee may have his DNA searched and placed in CODIS because 
his legal status as an arrestee diminishes his expectations of privacy.144  
This rationale is flawed. True, an arrestee does not enjoy the expansive 
expectation of privacy that a non-arrested individual enjoys (since he is in 
police custody).  But an arrestee maintains a higher expectation of privacy 
than a parolee, probationer, or convict. These individuals have a 
substantially diminished expectation of privacy and are thus subject to 
warrantless searches because they have been convicted of a crime.145 “A 
conviction causes a permanent change in the convicted person’s status, 
because the status changes from an ordinary citizen to a ‘lawfully 
adjudicated criminal[ ] whose proven conduct substantially heightens the 
government’s interest in monitoring’ him and ‘quite properly carries lasting 
consequences.’”146 An arrestee, in contrast, has yet to be convicted (and 
even charged in some jurisdictions)147 and is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty.  The rationale behind upholding warrantless searches against 
probationers, parolees, and convicts does not extend to arrestees 
 
144 Id. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S 520, 557, 99 S. Ct. 1861).  
145 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S 517 (1984); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 
(1987); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006). 
146 Beaugh, supra note 39, at 197 (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion)). 
147 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE § 296.1 (a)(1)(A) (2012) (collecting DNA “immediately following 
arrest”). 
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whatsoever, since the charges against them may even be dismissed! 
Because an arrestee retains an expectation of privacy greater than a 
convict, parolee, or probationer, a search of an arrestee’s DNA would not 
be justified without a warrant or probable cause.  Accordingly, the 
governmental interests that the majority in King belabored would not 
outweigh King’s expectation of privacy.  The government’s interest in 
identification is a pretext for searching for evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing, as the dissent illustrated, and such an interest is not 
constitutionally permissible to justify general searches.  
B. Fingerprints Differ Vastly From DNA  
The majority’s reasoning does not only suffer from its inability to 
distinguish arrestees from convicts, parolees, and probationers, but also 
from its ill-placed emphasis on the likeness between DNA and fingerprints.  
The Court peculiarly forgot to address the extremely sensitive information 
present in DNA, instead, it focused on the minimal invasiveness of the 
search. DNA information can be used to run familial searches,148 and 
although federal law provides for “safeguards,”149 there is no oversight 
body ensuring that such private information will not be misused.  
The use of “junk DNA” is also potentially problematic. Although the 
government claims that junk DNA is used to ensure anonymity of the 
donor,150 some scholars allege that junk DNA may actually contain 
valuable genetic material.151 
Furthermore, and most importantly, fingerprints, unlike DNA, are not 
used to solve crimes.  Instead, fingerprints are taken at arrest, to actually 
“identify” individuals by running a taken fingerprint through a database of 
known fingerprints, unlike what CODIS does.152  
The sensitive information present in DNA is enormous, and the field of 
 
148 See infra Part V.B. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2012). The Act contains certain safeguards: it imposes a criminal 
penalty of imprisonment of up to 1 year or a fine of no more than $250,000 to anyone who “knowingly 
discloses a sample or result . . . in any manner to any person not authorized to receive it, or obtains or 
uses, without authorization, such sample or result.” Id. It also limits disclosure of DNA information to 
criminal justice agencies for identification purposes, legal proceedings, and research and development. 
Id. at § 14132(b)(3). 
150 See DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 
(2000). 
151 See, e.g., JOHN M. BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology, and Genetics of STR 
Markers. 17-22 (2d ed. 2005) (Stating what we once referred to as “junk DNA” may later be found to 
contain valuable genetic information). 
152 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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science has yet to even fully understand its inner workings to an extensive 
degree. Notwithstanding this lack of knowledge, sensitive DNA 
information is used without regard to the future discoveries to be made 
about the mysterious DNA molecule. If junk DNA is found to contain 
sensitive material in the future, for example, then the government’s alleged 
safeguard of using non-identifying information is pointless. Using junk 
DNA when the possibility that it could contain sensitive information, 
especially while an existing system already functions efficiently to identify, 
is beyond comprehension.  
V. IGNORING THE TEMPTATION TO SUPPORT A POWERFUL CRIME-
FIGHTING TOOL: RECOGNIZING THE REAL WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
KING DECISION 
The King decision carries with it serious implications for all citizens: 
law-abiding or not. An array of individuals may unfortunately face the 
consequences of the Court’s decision to uphold the DNA collection from 
mere arrestees, including individuals who are falsely accused, mistakenly 
identified, acquitted, innocent, nonviolent, or ultimately not prosecuted.  
Even those who are correctly arrested under probable cause face the 
devastating consequences of DNA collection that the King decision fails to 
acknowledge.  First, if one wishes to remove his information from CODIS, 
the burden is on the individual.  Even after these efforts, only an 
individual’s DNA profile is removed, not the actual DNA sample.  Second, 
DNA can be used to facilitate familial searches—a search of a DNA 
sample’s family members, which has its own Fourth Amendment 
implications. 
A. Expungement of DNA in CODIS153 
At the federal level, expungement of a DNA profile may only occur if an 
arrestee obtains a final court order stating that the charges against her have 
been dismissed.154 The burden of expungement is on the arrestee; she must 
expend her efforts and go before the legal system to obtain a court order 
finalizing the disposition of the charges brought against her. 
If an arrestee refuses to submit a DNA sample, she is charged with a 
 
153 This section focuses on expungement at the federal level, since the federal scheme applies to all 
arrestees wishing to expunge their information from CODIS, regardless of which state they are arrested 
in.  
154 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1) (2006). 
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class A misdemeanor.155 Even worse, if an arrestee who is wrongly 
identified refuses to submit a DNA sample because of her non-involvement 
in the crime of arrest, she will still face a federal offense after her 
exoneration, because she failed to submit a DNA sample.  
Perhaps the most alarming feature of the federal government’s DNA 
statute is that after expungement, the government may retain an 
individual’s DNA sample indefinitely.156 Proponents of CODIS will 
quickly counter that like DNA, the government indefinitely retains 
fingerprints without any public objection.  The indefinite retention of DNA, 
however, raises different concerns in light of the possible discoveries about 
junk DNA usefulness.157  
Yet another concern is the undeniable possibility of government abuse of 
retained DNA samples. If the government has an ulterior motive in keeping 
an individual’s DNA, such as investigating his involvement in another 
crime, it might delay the submission of the final court order,158 or create a 
new profile from the retained DNA sample in order to investigate the 
individual.  
Granting the government unlimited access to DNA through its ability to 
indefinitely retain samples from the profiles entered in CODIS is a bold 
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of privacy, especially since 
the government retains no interest in a DNA sample once an arrestee 
proves that the charges against him were never filed or were dropped.  
B. DNA Can be Used to Facilitate Familial Searches 
Because DNA contains sensitive genetic information, it can be used to 
perform familial searches. A familial search is a partial search in which law 
enforcement, who cannot match a recovered DNA sample from a crime 
scene to the CODIS database, search the database for someone who might 
be related to the recovered sample.159 If a familial relationship between the 
known individual in CODIS and the unknown sample is shown, law 
enforcement can find and investigate the known individual and his family 
in efforts to find the true perpetrator.160 This has serious privacy 
 
155 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5)(A) (2006).  
156 See Tarricone, supra note 41, at 221. 
157 See supra Part IV.B. 
158 See Beaugh, supra note 39, at 199. 
159 See Jeffery Rose, Genetic Surveillance for All?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009) 
http://www.tinyurl.com/rosencodis. 
160 Id. 
GIANNAROS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2016  1:19 PM 
476 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:4 
 
implications. Firstly, it subjects purely innocent individuals to harassment 
and investigation by law enforcement. Secondly, African Americans are 
more likely to be the subject of this harassment, since they represent about 
40 percent of people convicted of felonies each year.161  One study showed 
that “17 percent of African American citizens could be identified through 
familial searches, as opposed to only 4 percent of the Caucasian 
population.”162 Lastly, probable cause to search CODIS for a match is 
absent.   
Proponents of DNA searching argue that CODIS only analyzes junk 
DNA, the part of a DNA strand that does not contain any genetic 
information. But these proponents fail to give full credit to the ever-
developing field of science; many scholars assert that junk DNA has the 
potential to indeed reveal sensitive information.163  
Proponents also claim that familial searching is not a real criticism of 
DNA collection because it is not a procedure that the FBI authorizes.164 
But this neglects the fact that as of 2011, California, Texas, Colorado, and 
Virginia all perform familial searching.165  
Although familial searching can be useful, it presents serious privacy 
concerns.  Existing DNA profiles being searched for a relationship with an 
unknown DNA sample have not given law enforcement probable cause to 
search their DNA profiles, and if a link is found, they are subject to the 
harassing techniques of law enforcement officers who seek information.  A 
2008 study noted that 84 percent of Americans thought that laws 
prohibiting law enforcement from gaining access to genetic research 
information are important,166 indicating society’s consensus that law 





163 See BUTLER, supra note 151.  
164 See SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELI, DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 76-81 (2d ed. 2012). 
165 Familial Searching, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/familial-searching (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). 
166 David J. Kaufman et al., Public Opinion about the Importance of Privacy in Biobank Research, 
85 Am. J. Human Genetics 643, 649 (Nov. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2775831. 
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VI. PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE FEDERAL ARRESTEE DNA COLLECTION 
STATUTE 
As an obvious start, Congress can amend the DNA Fingerprint Act of 
2005 by reverting to the pre-arrestee version of the statute, where only 
those convicted of a felony were subject to DNA collection.167 
Alternatively, I present some possibilities that all serve to protect the 
government’s interest in “identification” while maintaining an arrestees 
privacy rights. 
One possible legislative solution is to limit the collection of arrestee 
DNA to individuals who have been convicted.  Law enforcement would 
still be free to pursue a warrant based upon probable cause to collect and 
process the DNA before conviction if it deemed it necessary, as it normally 
does.  But this differs from the pre-arrestee version of the statute because 
the warrant would permit the testing of an individual’s DNA against 
unknown DNA only if there exists probable cause to link the individual to 
the sample (which is linked to the crime the arrestee is suspected of being 
involved in) instead of allowing an endless search through all unidentified 
DNA samples.  If a warrant is issued, but the arrestee is nonetheless found 
innocent at trial or has the charges against him dropped, the government 
would have the burden of expunging the profile.  Although critics may 
argue that the already burdened system would be disadvantaged by such a 
policy, it is only fair that the government bear the costs of a policy it 
wishes to implement.168 Lastly, Congress could specifically provide for the 
immediate and permanent destruction of all DNA samples, adopting a 
measure where the government would notify an arrestee and his attorney 
that the sample has been destroyed, and assigning an oversight body to 
ensure these procedures are followed. 
If “identification” really is the motivating goal behind CODIS, then this 
proposal would maintain the government’s interest in identifying an 
individual.  Fingerprints would operate in the meantime to ascertain that an 
individual is who he claims to be, because, as illustrated in the facts of 
King, identifying an arrestee is not an urgent concern, considering the fact 
that King’s DNA was used to identify him days after his arrest.  If the 
 
167 See Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NIJ.GOV, 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/264/pages/debating-DNA.aspx (Oct. 29, 2009); 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a 
(West 2005). 
168 See Beaugh supra note 39, at 194 (comparing placing the burden of expungement on the 
government to tort and contract theory, where the party who causes the injury must bear the cost). 
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arrestee is convicted, law enforcement is free to use his DNA in the 
database to find matches as it currently does, because at that point, it is 
established that the individual’s expectation of privacy is substantially 
diminished. 
Finally, Congress could keep the arrestee DNA collection statute as is, 
but in order to ensure that CODIS is only used for “identification” 
purposes, and to make it as closely analogous to fingerprinting as possible, 
Congress could enact legislation that expressly prohibits matching the 
known arrestee DNA profiles against the unknown DNA samples.  If used 
solely for the purpose of taking an arrestee’s DNA sample to ensure that an 
individual is who he claims to be, it will be akin to fingerprinting and will 
finally achieve the “identification” purpose the statute currently lacks. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The current arrestee DNA collection statute violates longstanding 
notions of privacy, probable cause, and the presumption of innocence.  The 
Court’s decision in Maryland v. King fails to recognize that identification 
of an arrestee is not the primary function of DNA identification laws.   
It is irrefutable that the fields of science and technology are advancing at 
unprecedented rates. These advancements often have serious privacy 
implications, and in an effort to uphold the worthy guarantees of the 
Constitution, the judicial and legislative branches must be cognizant of 
them.  DNA has the potential to be a powerful crime-fighting agent, but the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
combined with the serious risks associated with granting unfettered access 
to sensitive genetic information, trump this potential.  Therefore, a proposal 
allowing for law enforcement to search an arrestee’s DNA only against 
DNA profiles in which there exists probable cause will not only ensure that 
the extent to which this sensitive information is exposed is limited, but also 
that the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees against unreasonable searches and 
seizures are vigilantly guarded.  
 
